security.txt: every RFC 9116 field, shown in the files of 160 software vendors
A security.txt is a small text file at /.well-known/security.txt that tells a security researcher where to report a vulnerability. RFC 9116 defines it: two fields are required, a Contact and an Expires date, and seven more are optional. Below, each field is explained with lines from the 100 real files we read at the vendors in this registry, followed by whole files that pass every check, the files that have expired or lack a required field, and how these vendors compare with the wider web.
Where the file goes, and what it looks like
The file sits at /.well-known/security.txt on every host it covers, is served over HTTPS, and has the content type text/plain in UTF-8 (RFC 9116, section 3). It applies only to the host it was fetched from, not to subdomains or the parent domain. The older top-level /security.txt is kept for legacy compatibility; when both exist, the /.well-known/ file is the one that counts. Each line is a field, a comment starting with #, or blank, and a field is a name, a colon and a value. The smallest file the standard allows has two lines:
Contact: mailto:security@example.com Expires: 2027-10-31T23:59:59Z
Of the 100 files we read, 94 were at /.well-known/. Bitwarden, Datadog, Drata, Notion, Piwik PRO and Wix serve the file only at the top-level path on the host we read. Wire serves it with a character set other than UTF-8. 7 files contain lines that are neither a field, a comment nor blank, which a tool following the standard cannot read:
- Adobe:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----and 50 more lines - Aircall:
--- COORDINATED VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE ---and 31 more lines - Amazon Web Services:
AWS Vulnerability Disclosure Program: https://hackerone.com/aws_vdp - Databricks:
Bug Bounty: https://hackerone.com/databricksand 1 more line - Dropbox:
Bug Bounty Contact: bugbounty@dropbox.comand 3 more lines - Supabase:
At Supabase, we consider the security of our systems a top priority. B…and 33 more lines - Zoom:
https://www.zoom.us/.well-known/security.txt
Field by field
Field names are case-insensitive, a field may appear more than once unless its definition says otherwise, and a reader must ignore any field it does not know (section 2.4). Across the 100 files:
| Field | RFC 9116 | Files using it | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
Contact required | section 2.5.3 | 97 | 97% |
Expires required | section 2.5.5 | 76 | 76% |
Encryption | section 2.5.4 | 42 | 42% |
Policy | section 2.5.7 | 78 | 78% |
Canonical | section 2.5.2 | 53 | 53% |
Preferred-Languages | section 2.5.8 | 68 | 68% |
Acknowledgments | section 2.5.1 | 30 | 30% |
Hiring | section 2.5.6 | 61 | 61% |
CSAF | CSAF 2.0, not RFC 9116 | 1 | 1% |
Contact (required)
How to report a vulnerability: an email address, a phone number or a web page. The value must be a URI, so an email address is written mailto: and a phone number tel:, and a web address must start with https://. A file may list several, in order of preference, the first being the preferred one. 97 of the 100 files have one; 30 list more than one.
- an email address as a mailto: URI: 62 files, e.g. 1Password
Contact: mailto:security@agilebits.com; AdyenContact: mailto:responsibledisclosure@adyen.com - a web page or form on a bug bounty platform: 24 files, e.g. Adobe
Contact: https://app.intigriti.com/programs/adobe/adobepublic/detail; AmplitudeContact: https://tracker.bugcrowd.com/amplitude - a web page or form on another site: 30 files, e.g. Atlassian
Contact: https://www.atlassian.com/trust/security/report-a-vulnerability; BitwardenContact: https://bitwarden.com/contact/ - an address not written as a URI: 11 files, e.g. Adobe
Contact: psirt@adobe.com; AirtableContact: security@airtable.com
Adobe, Airtable, Databricks, Grammarly, IONOS Cloud, Infomaniak, JetBrains, OVHcloud, STRATO, Sentry and Smartsheet write at least one address without the mailto: scheme, or with a space after it, so a tool that follows the standard may not recognise it. 78 of the 100 files with a security.txt link a disclosure policy; of the 96 with a contact, 40 give only email, 32 only a web page or form, and 24 both. When the contact is email, the standard recommends an encryption key as well.
Expires (required)
The date and time after which the file should be treated as stale, in the RFC 3339 format (2027-10-31T23:59:59Z). It must appear exactly once, and the standard recommends a date less than a year ahead. It exists so that a forgotten file with a dead mailbox stops being trusted. 76 of the 100 files have one.
- in UTC, ending in Z: 74 files, e.g. Adobe
Expires: 2027-07-30T01:00:00.000Z; AdyenExpires: 2025-12-31T22:59:00.000Z - with an offset from UTC: 1 file, e.g. WhatsApp Business
Expires: 2026-12-02T02:06:55-08:00 - not in the RFC 3339 format: 1 file, e.g. HubSpot
Expires: 2034-06-01:00:00.000Z
24 files have no Expires at all, 6 had passed it on the day we read them, and 26 of the 68 in date set it more than a year ahead. All three are listed further down.
Encryption
Where to get the key a researcher should use to encrypt a report. The key itself must not be in the field: the value is a URI pointing to it. 42 of the 100 files have one.
- a link to a key file on a web server: 33 files, e.g. 1Password
Encryption: https://1password.com/support-at-agilebits-pubkey-42F3D4D4.asc; AdobeEncryption: https://helpx.adobe.com/security/key.html - a link to a public key server: 7 files, e.g. HubSpot
Encryption: https://keys.openpgp.org/vks/v1/by-fingerprint/3B7FE450446A6DF8BC1086A…; IONOS CloudEncryption: https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=security%40ionos.com - the key's fingerprint, as an openpgp4fpr URI: 2 files, e.g. CleverReach
Encryption: openpgp4fpr:A2B7E482E8CD57A4D1A8160962C0E323C740650E; Piwik PROEncryption: openpgp4fpr:4C75B4E46772504A2CBF4B6D1E6F8507C7980CC1
27 files give an email contact and no Encryption field.
Policy
A link to the vulnerability disclosure policy: what a researcher may test, how to report, and what the organisation commits to in return. The standard also points here for the scope of the file. 78 of the 100 files have one.
- on a bug bounty platform: 23 files, e.g. Airtable
Policy: https://hackerone.com/airtable; AsanaPolicy: https://bugcrowd.com/asana - on another site: 56 files, e.g. Adobe
Policy: https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html/security/policy.ug.html; AdyenPolicy: https://www.adyen.com/policies-and-disclaimer/responsible-disclosure
Canva, Microsoft, Okta, Retool, WhatsApp Business and Wire list more than one policy.
Canonical
The address or addresses where this file is meant to be found. If a file fetched from one address lists only others, the standard says its contents should not be trusted. 53 of the 100 files have one, and 6 list several, such as Clay's 2.
Anthropic's file at www.anthropic.com lists only anthropic.com; Canva's file at www.canva.com lists only canva.com; CleverReach's file at www.cleverreach.com lists only cleverreach.com.
Preferred-Languages
The languages a report may be written in, as language tags separated by commas, with no order of priority. It may appear only once; without it, a researcher may assume English. 68 of the 100 files have one, and 58 of those give en alone. The others:
Adobe en, ro, hi; Bitwarden en, de; CleverReach en,de; DATEV de, en; Infomaniak fr, en; Lusha en, he; Scaleway en, fr; Spendesk en, fr; TeamViewer en, de; Wire en, de.
Acknowledgments
A link to a page thanking researchers who reported vulnerabilities. 30 of the 100 files have one.
- a hall of fame on a bug bounty platform: 17 files, e.g. Asana
Acknowledgments: https://bugcrowd.com/engagements/asana/hall_of_fames; BitwardenAcknowledgments: https://hackerone.com/bitwarden/thanks - a page on another site: 14 files, e.g. Adobe
Acknowledgments: https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html; AdyenAcknowledgments: https://www.adyen.com/policies-and-disclaimer/responsible-disclosure-h…
Grammarly, OVHcloud, Slack, WordPress.com and Zoho spell the field Acknowledgements. The standard's name is Acknowledgments, and a reader must ignore a field it does not know, so the link is invisible to tools.
Hiring
A link to security job openings. 61 of the 100 files have one, e.g. Adobe Hiring: https://www.adobe.com/careers.html; Adyen Hiring: https://careers.adyen.com/vacancies?team=Security.
CSAF
Not part of RFC 9116: the OASIS CSAF 2.0 standard uses this field to point to a machine-readable feed of security advisories. One file has it: Microsoft CSAF: https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/provider-metadata.json.
Fields the standard does not define
A file may carry other fields, and a reader must ignore any it does not know. These appear in the files we read:
1Password Site: https://hackerone.com/1password; 1Password Signature: https://1Password.com/.well-known/security.txt.sig; Airtable Permission: none; Cursor Secondary-Contact: mailto:security-reports@cursor.com; Infomaniak BugBounty: https://yeswehack.com/programs/infomaniak-bug-bounty-progra…; OVHcloud Signature: https://www.ovh.com/.well-known/security.txt.sig; Scaleway Abuse: https://abuse.scaleway.com/; Spendesk Bug-Bounty: True; Spendesk Last-Update: 2026-10-28T21:26:02Z; Wix Article: https://support.wix.com/en/article/reporting-a-security-issue.
Signing the file
The standard recommends an OpenPGP cleartext signature around the whole file, with a Canonical field inside it so the signature also vouches for where the file lives (section 2.3). Verifying the key is left to the researcher. 15 of the 100 files are signed; we did not verify the signatures. Piwik PRO and Sentry sign without a Canonical field. 1Password and OVHcloud instead point to a separate signature file in a Signature field, which RFC 9116 does not define. Adobe opens as a signed message but has no signature block, and is not counted as signed.
Whole files that pass every check
Three real files, quoted exactly as we stored them. They were picked by rule, not by hand: every check on this page passes, the expiry date is under a year ahead, and the file names its canonical location, a disclosure policy and the languages reports can be written in. The rule takes the two shortest such files and the shortest signed one. 21 of the 100 files meet it.
Contact: mailto:security@mistral.ai Expires: 2027-05-05T23:59:59.000Z Policy: https://hackerone.com/58acc269-165e-4d18-a2d8-61f296cdea60/embedded_submissions/new Preferred-Languages: EN Canonical: https://mistral.ai/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@kahoot.com Expires: 2027-10-02T16:01:01.000Z Encryption: https://kahoot.com/security_public_key.txt Preferred-Languages: en Canonical: https://kahoot.com/.well-known/security.txt Policy: https://kahoot.com/disclosure-policy.txt
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 # Zendesk - Vulnerability Disclosure Contact: https://www.zendesk.com/company/policies-and-guidelines/responsible-disclosure-policy/ # Bug Bounty Program Contact: https://bugcrowd.com/engagements/zendesk Contact: mailto:security@zendesk.com Encryption: https://www.zendesk.com/.well-known/zendesk-psirt-public.asc Policy: https://www.zendesk.com/company/policies-and-guidelines/responsible-disclosure-policy/ Preferred-Languages: en Canonical: https://www.zendesk.com/.well-known/security.txt Hiring: https://www.zendesk.com/company/careers/ Expires: 2027-04-16T00:00:00.000Z -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iKcEARYKAE8WIQQWbtRbS6npPD9gMI0FwFA9Ed6GuQUCafKWYRsUgAAAAAAEAA5t YW51MiwyLjUrMS4xMiwwLDMVHHNlY3VyaXR5QHplbmRlc2suY29tAAoJEAXAUD0R 3oa5YQkBAKmuLoE5SFOI1QQCXSb15DEu1zppejeoxDlo44exlO0xAPsFdUMpR4cN HHh5xv/cbw/C5sgGakzMTv3GoHomDtOlAA== =HUvi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Expired files
These files were past their own Expires date on the day we read them:
| Vendor | Expires, as written | Read on | File |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adyen | 2025-12-31T22:59:00.000Z | 2026-10-17 | www.adyen.com |
| CleverReach | 2024-12-31T22:59:00.000Z | 2026-10-25 | www.cleverreach.com |
| Element | 2025-01-30T23:00:00.000Z | 2026-10-17 | element.io |
| Mentimeter | 2026-10-02T12:00:00.000Z | 2026-11-09 | www.mentimeter.com |
| Microsoft | 2026-09-23T16:00:00.000Z | 2026-10-17 | www.microsoft.com |
| Smartsheet | 2026-07-01T04:00:00.000Z | 2026-11-09 | www.smartsheet.com |
An expired file is usually forgotten rather than abandoned: the contact in it may well still work. Amazon Web Services' file had expired on 24 September 2026 when we first read it on 11 October, and had been renewed by our next reading on 17 October.
Missing a required field
24 files have no Expires field at all and 4 have no Contact field, the line the file exists to carry. 1 has an Expires that is not a date in the format the standard requires (RFC 3339).
Expiry dates years ahead
The standard recommends an Expires less than a year away, so that someone looks at the file again. 26 of the 68 files in date set it further out, measured from the day we read them. This is a recommendation, not a requirement, and none of these is counted as a fault above.
| Vendor | Expires, as written | Years ahead |
|---|---|---|
| Drata | 2034-02-28T07:00:00.000Z | 7.3 |
| Google Analytics | 2030-04-01T00:00:00z | 3.5 |
| Google Cloud | 2030-04-01T00:00:00z | 3.5 |
| Google Workspace | 2030-04-01T00:00:00z | 3.5 |
| Notion | 2030-01-01T07:00:00.000Z | 3.2 |
| Docker | 2030-01-01T05:00:00.000Z | 3.2 |
| Datadog | 2029-12-31T23:00:00.000Z | 3.2 |
| Zoom | 2029-12-31T00:00:00.000Z | 3.2 |
| STACKIT | 2029-12-07T22:59:00.000Z | 3.1 |
| Discord | 2029-08-12T13:37:00.000Z | 2.8 |
| Intercom | 2029-03-15T00:00:00z | 2.4 |
| Amplitude | 2028-12-31T23:59:00Z | 2.2 |
| Scaleway | 2028-12-31T09:45:00.000Z | 2.2 |
| Zoho | 2028-06-30T23:59:59.000Z | 1.7 |
| DigitalOcean | 2028-04-05T04:00:00.000Z | 1.5 |
| CrowdStrike | 2028-04-01T04:00:00.000Z | 1.5 |
| IONOS Cloud | 2028-02-11T23:30:00.000Z | 1.3 |
| STRATO | 2028-02-10T11:00:00.000Z | 1.3 |
| Contentsquare | 2028-01-31T21:59:00.000Z | 1.3 |
| Squarespace | 2028-01-01T05:00:00.000Z | 1.2 |
| Linear | 2027-12-31T23:59:00.000Z | 1.2 |
| n8n | 2027-12-31T22:59:00.000Z | 1.2 |
| Perplexity | 2027-12-31T00:00:00Z | 1.2 |
| Piwik PRO | 2027-12-16T23:00:00.000Z | 1.2 |
| Hetzner | 2027-11-11T13:14:00.000Z | 1.1 |
| Figma | 2027-10-21T15:25:00.000Z | 1.0 |
Against the wider web
Surveys of the top million websites find security.txt on about one site in a hundred. Among the software companies businesses buy from, it is the norm. Our sample is 160 vendors, not a million domains, and the studies define "compliant" differently, so the comparison is made check by check:
| Check | 160 vendors here (2026-11-09) | Top 1M domains (Uriports, Jan 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Publish a security.txt | 63% | 1.25% |
Of those, no Expires field | 24% | 45% |
| Of those, already expired | 6% | 13% |
| Of those, signed | 15% | 11% |
Wider-web figures: Uriports, "Follow-Up on Security.txt Adoption", January 2025. Earlier studies found 0.49% of the top million (Findlay and Abdou, 2022) and higher adoption among the most visited sites (Li et al., IMC 2021).
No file
47 vendors answer neither /.well-known/security.txt nor the older /security.txt on their main website. That does not mean they have no way to report a vulnerability: a vendor can publish one on an ordinary page, which this count does not look for. It means the standard place to look is empty:
ActiveCampaign, Apollo.io, Attio, Backblaze, Box, Brevo, Cisco Webex, Docusign, Doodle, Elastic Cloud, Gong, Grafana Labs, Klaviyo, KnowBe4, Langdock, Langfuse, Mailgun, Make, Mapbox, Miro, Mural, Netlify, Nextcloud, OneTrust, Optimizely, Oracle Cloud, Pennylane, Personio, Pipedrive, Pleo, Postmark (ActiveCampaign), Rippling, S3NS, Salesforce, Sinch, SiteGround, SurveyMonkey, T Cloud Public, Typeform, Usercentrics, WeTransfer, Workday, Xero, Zapier, ZoomInfo, Zscaler, monday.com.
3DS Outscale, Matomo Cloud, Telegram, Twilio, Vonage answer the path with a web page instead of a text file, which a tool reading security.txt cannot use. MongoDB and SAP disallow the path in their robots.txt, so we did not read it and say nothing about whether a file is there.
Download the data (CSV): every row with its source and the date it was read.Cite as: eucsoft, “security.txt at SaaS vendors”, https://eucsoft.com/en/findings/security-txt/, data read up to 2026-11-09.
Questions
Where does a security.txt file go?
At /.well-known/security.txt on each host it covers, served over HTTPS as text/plain in UTF-8 (RFC 9116, section 3). The older top-level /security.txt is allowed for legacy compatibility only, and when both exist the /.well-known/ file wins. A file applies only to the host it was fetched from, not to subdomains or the parent domain. Of the 100 vendor files read here, 94 were found at /.well-known/.
Which fields are required in security.txt?
Two: Contact, which can appear several times, and Expires, exactly once. Everything else is optional. Of the 100 vendors here that publish a file, 24 have no Expires field and 4 no Contact field.
How far ahead should Expires be?
RFC 9116 recommends less than a year, so that someone looks at the file again; it does not set a limit. Of the 68 vendor files here that are in date, 26 set Expires more than a year from the day we read them, and 6 had already passed it.
Does security.txt have to be signed?
No. An OpenPGP cleartext signature is recommended, not required, and the standard recommends a Canonical field alongside it so the signature also covers the file's address. 15 of the 100 vendor files here are signed.
How this was read
Each file was fetched from the vendor's main website, on the homepage's host and then on the bare domain, and parsed field by field without a model; values are kept as written. The latest readings are from 2026-11-09, and the files are read again every week, so a vendor that renews its file drops off the expired list at the next reading. Products of one company that share a website share its file, so Google's three products count three times. 6 vendors have not been read yet. The full method is on the methodology page.